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THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCEITS FEASIBILITY AND IMPLICATIONS

COLONEL JACK R. BUTLER, USA
attacks on the military; when the public
prestige of the military seemed never to have
been lower; when necessary Congressional
support was questionable; when the youth of
this nation, from whom the volunteers must
flow, were conditioned against military
service by antiwar sentiments, antiwar
demonstrations, and the open dispensing of
information on how to beat the draft.
The volunteer force concept struck a
vibrant emotional chord among military
professionals, public officials and private
citizens. It set the stage for indictment rather
than rational thinking and there emerged a
diverse array of opinions. Too often these
positions and counterpositions are based upon
half-truths, inadequate data, undocumented
assertions or simple emotion, rather than
upon detached investigation. The purpose of
this paper is to determine what the issues are,
then to examine them objectively. The matter
of determining the validity of the volunteer
force concept must be left to the future,
when data will be available regarding its
successes and failures in practice.

(Why is an all-volunteer armed force
needed? Is such a force achievable? Is it
desirable? What are some of the
objections to an all-volunteer force? What
must be done to make the all-volunteer
force workable?)

I am announcing today that the Army is
committed to an all-out effort in working
toward a zero draft-a volunteer force.
-General William C. Westmoreland
October 13,1970

With these words, the Chief of Staff, United
States Army, formally committed the Army
to an all-out effort to achieve an all-volunteer
force. "In accepting this challenge," General
Westmoreland said, "we in the Army will
bend every effort to achieve our goal."'
It was apparent from the beginning that
putting this resolution into effect would not
be as simple as its announcement. I t came at a
time when there were unprecedented public

HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Colonel Jack R. Butler, Infantry, USAWC 1972,
holds a Bachelors Degree from the University of
Omaha and a Masters Degree (Psychology) from
Tulane University. He has held a variety of staff and
command assignments including duty in Korea and
Vietnam. On the Army Staff, Colonel Butler directed
the Army's 1969 study of the all-volunteer concept
and subsequently served with
the Office of the Special
Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for the Modern Volunteer
Army. He was an adult
delegate to the White House
Conference on Youth at Estes
Park Colorado in 1971 and is
an active Fellow in the
Inter-University Seminar on
Armed Forces and Society.

Looking back for a moment, we see what is
often overlooked: that for over 160 years,
except for periods of major wars, there was
no compulsory military service in the United
States. Traditionally, the defense strategy of
this country has been based instead upon a
small professional force, reinforced by a large
trained manpower reserve.
Although the Militia Act of 1792
established a policy of universal military
obligation, the American people have always
associated that obligation with total national
emergency. Consequently, it has been viewed
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as a wartime obligation. Only since 1948 has
the draft become a permanent part of our
manpower procurement policy, beginning in
the nineteen fifties and sixties to take on the
sense of a long-standing American tradition.
Until the mid-sixties Americans accepted
conscription as a way of life. In large part,
interest in selective service was dampened by
a growing manpower pool and low monthly
draft calls which resulted in an ever decreasing
percentage of those required to serve.
The Vietnam buildup, however, brought
much larger draft calls and increased
vulnerability to involuntary military service.
It brought also a surge of antiwar and
antimilitaiy sentiment. Although the protest
movement found its roots on the college
campuses, the controversy soon spread to the
society at large, developing into an incredibly
complex national debate which involved
many issues that challenged the fundamental
philosophy underlying the domestic and
international policies of our nation. Thus we
entered the seventies with an unprecedented
attack on the integrity of the government, the
values of the armed forces, and increased
pressure for abolition of the draft.
THE BASIC ISSUE

The need to do something about the
pressing social problems in our country, such
as the plight of our cities, poverty, ecology,
and education, is clearly evident. But our
efforts to solve these problems may very well
be wasted if our nation has no effective
military force to support her national interest.
Thus we must accept the premise that the
United States needs a strong military force;
and once this premise is accepted, the
question then becomes how best to raise and
maintain that force in a democratic society.
T h r e e major alternatives have been
advanced: the first is to reform and continue
selective service; second is to move to a
c o m p l e t e l y volunteer military
establishment-an all-volunteer force; and
third is to develop some form of national
service.
Whatever manpower procurement program
evolves, it must not only supply military
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requirements in terms of quantity and quality
but also be viable under peacetime and
wartime conditions. One of the vital lessons
of past wars is that volunteers will not
produce the manpower needed for large scale
or protracted c o n f l i c t ; 2 s o m e form of
selective service must operate, whether it is
actively engaged in the induction of men or
simply serves to register, examine, and classify
men on a standby basis.
In the event of a transition to a completely
volunteer armed force, the draft would be
necessary until manpower strengths were met
through enlistments; thereafter, a standby
draft authority would be necessary to insure
that national security requirements were
satisfied. Similarly, in the event of adoption
of a national service concept, selective service
would have a role. Therefore, the Selective
Service System is central to any manpower
procurement policy.
The Selective Service System became the
subject of comprehensive Congressional
hearings beginning in 1969. As a result, on
November 26, 1969, draft reform legislation
which authorized the use of lottery was
signed into law. Subsequently, President
Nixon, with the consent of Congress, issued a
series of Executive Orders which discontinued
o c c u p a t i o n a l , p a t e r n i t y , and student
deferments (except for those engaged in
officer-producing programs such as ROTC or
those "vital" to the national interest).
While much has been done to improve the
Selective Service System, inequity has not
been removed. This was recognized by
President Nixon when he stated ". . . there
will be inequity as long as any of our young
men have to serve when others do not have to
serve."3 In keeping with this philosophy, the
President directed the Department of Defense
to take actions designed to reduce reliance on
the draft and established the all-volunteer
force as a national objective.4
When to shift from a draft-supported to an
all-volunteer force is a difficult question, but
the Department of Defense has set July 1,
1973 as the present goal for achieving zero
inductions. Coincidentally, the 92nd Congress
extended induction authority for only two
years (to July 1 , 1973) instead of the usual
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four, and placed yearly ceilings on the
number of men who can be inducted into the
armed forces.
No o n e can predict whether the
all-volunteer force will become a workable
reality. The concept has great appeal, since a
force composed solely of volunteers would
blunt antimilitary attacks by the expedient of
avoiding conscription. The hope is that pay
and other benefits would substitute for
compulsion as a means of obtaining the
quantity and quality of personnel required.
This seemingly desirable solution, however, is
replete with pitfalls which must be considered
carefully.
QUANTITY

Quantity is central to feasibility. Without
enough volunteers to fill the ranks, an
all-volunteer armed force is impossible.
The last time the United States tried an
all-volunteer force was in 1947. The draft law
which had been in effect since 1940 was
allowed to expire. To compensate for the loss
of draftees, recruiting programs were
reorganized and intensified and recruiter
strength increased. The Army introduced
enlistment options to include choice of
g e o g r a p h i c l o c a t i o n s and specific
organizations. The Army also experimented
with one-year and eighteen-month periods of
service. In spite of these efforts, by January
1948 the armed forces had dropped 15
percent below authorized levels. With an
authorized strength of 669,000, the Army
had only 550,000 men in uniform.5 The
National Guard, authorized at 450,000 men,
had only 290,000,6 while the Army Reserve
became largely a paper organization which
had not trained for two years. In March 1948,
President Truman asked Congress to revive
the draft.
The new Selective Service Act was signed
into law in June 1948. In spite of a
subsequent one-third cut in Army recruiting
strength and the actual drafting of only
35,000 during November and December 1948
and January 1949, Army strength rose by
about 100,000 by the end of June 1949.7
While the 1947-48 attempt at sustaining a
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volunteer force left the services with too few
men, it should be recognized that this
experience demonstrated only the
difficulty-and not the impossibility-of
achieving a viable all-volunteer force. That
effort, almost a quarter of a century ago, was
limited. The manpower pool was considerably
smaller and, most important, there was no
real attempt to attract volunteers through
adequate pay and other benefits.
The current attempt to achieve an
all-volunteer force is set in the context of a
significant cutback in the desired force level.
As a result of Vietnam withdrawals and
economy actions, total active duty strength
should return (from a peak of 3.5 million
reached in 1968) to pre-Vietnam level of 2.5
million, or even less in the foreseeable future.
To maintain an armed force of 2.5 million
men, approximately 500,000 new accessions
are required each year. Historically, we could
expect 350,000 of these to be supplied by
first-term enlistments and 150,000 by
inductions. However, in the absence of the
draft, not only the 150,000 inductees would
be lost, but also those many thousands of
first- term regular enlistees who were
motivated to enlist because of the draft.
E s t i m a t e s of t h e percentage of
draft-induced enlistments vary by source.
Two surveys conducted by the Department of
Defense in 1964 and 1968 revealed that draft
motivation had risen from 38 percent in 1964
to 54 percent in 1968.8 Indications are that
today it probably exceeds 60 percent. In the
context of a completely volunteerforce, this
has serious implications.
T h e President's Commission on an
All-Volunteer Armed Force believes the loss
of these men can be offset and reported to
the President in early 1970 that an
all-volunteer armed force was feasible and
more desirable than a mixed force of
volunteers and conscripts.9 The central thrust
of the Commission's approach to achieving an
all-volunteer force was a substantial increase
in military pay with particular emphasis on
men serving their first term in the armed
forces.
Army manpower planners expressed serious
misgivings a b o u t t h e Commission's

methodology. While it is recognized that pay
is a powerful motivator, frequently other
factors, such as job satisfaction, decent
housing, and public respect become more
important. Moreover, in projecting the
c a p a b i l i t y t o attract volunteers, the
Commission based its calculations for the FY
1970-80 time frame on the military's
pre-Vietnam enlistment experience. Implicit
in this approach is the assumption that the
behavior patterns of potential enlistees in the
post-Vietnam period will be the same as those
which existed before Vietnam. This
assumption fails to recognize that attitudes
toward military service have changed
markedly since 1965, thus impairing
recruitment seriously.
We now know that the Army's misgivings
were sound. The Commission underestimated
the Army's FY 1972 accession requirements
by 40 percent. In addition, the number of
true volunteers the Army expects in FY 1972
was overestimated.
In approximating the number of required
recruits for military service, attention has
been directed only to the Army's manpower
deficits. T h i s procedure involves the
assumption that if the Army's manpower
demands can be met, the other services will be
able to staff their forces with volunteers.
There is a major limitation inherent in this
approach. Although the analysis leans toward
the Army's requirements relative to other
services, there is an implicit assumption that
all branches in the Army have equal drawing
power for volunteers. Before initiation of the
Modern Volunteer Army Program, fewer than
5 percent of all Army enlistments were for
the combat arms (Infantry, Armor, and
Artillery) and only about 1.7 percent of all
10
enlistees chose the Infantry.
Due to
occupational hazards and discomfort, combat
arms requirements are harder to fill than
non-combat arms skills. Therefore, an overall
Army manpower supply factor which assumes
perfect substitution among branches of the
Army t e n d s t o underestimate actual
requirements.
Assuming a post-Vietnam Army strength of
about 900,000, approximately 200,000 new

accessions would be required annually. In
fiscal year 1969, the United States Anny
Recruiting Command obtained 200,775
first-term enlistments; of these, according to
the 1968 Department of Defense survey, 58
percent were draft motivated.11 If these data
hold t r u e in a f u t u r e all-volunteer
environment, the Army can be expected to
experience an annual enlisted shortfall of
115,676. T o prevent this shortfall, dramatic
action directed at personnel procurement and
r e t e n t i o n is required. Without draft
motivation, input to officer producing
programs will decline. ROTC enrollment has
already declined dramatically since 1968-69.
However, because ROTC production, like the
United States Military Academy, is a fairly
fixed program with a two- to four-year lead
time, officer procurement in the near future is
not considered critical. Supporting this
conclusion are t h e reduced officer
requirements in a declining force structure
and the option to expand other officer
producing programs such as Officer Candidate
Schools.
The outlook for procurement of medical
specialists and techniciansis not as optimistic.
The continuing shortage of personnel in every
h e a l t h occupation will generate more
competition for their services. Without the
draft it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to attract sufficient medical personnel. Not
only would the accessions obtained by the
"doctor draft" be lost, but so would those
who are propelled by the draft to seek
admission to military medical training
programs.12
I t is recognized that the preceding analysis
reduces the problem to its simplest
quantitative form. There are other influences
on gain and loss rates which were not
considered. Significant among these are
increased or decreased international threats,
unemployment rates among the prime age
groups, and most important, public image of
the military. This notwithstanding, even a
cursory examination leads t o the conclusion
that in the absence of additional incentives,
there will be quantitative problems under the
all-volunteer concept.
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QUALITY

A military force derives its vitality from the
experience and capabilities of the personnel
of which it is composed. No organization can
function effectively if all of its people are
minimally qualified. A military establishment
restricted to an input level just sufficient to
meet minimum aptitude scores would lack
provisions for the career element of the force,
with its cadre of combat leaders, technicians,
and men of higher skills.
Since 1941, the military requirement for
technical and scientific skills has more than
d o u b l e d , while t h e requirement for
exclusively military skills has declined by
two-thirds.13 The question which confronts
the military is whether, without the draft, it
can meet the requirements of ever-increasing
sophistication in technology and weaponry.
What is often overlooked is the fact that
the draft not only affects the quantity, but
also the quality composition of the armed
forces. The characteristics of first-term
enlistees who were draft motivated in 1968
are revealing. Draft pressure to enlist was
substantially higher for those over 20 years of
age when compared to the 17-19 year old
group (70 percent vs. 48 percent). When
compared to those with less than a high
school education, high school graduates and
those with at least some college were also
more inclined to enlist because of the
impending threat of the draft (33 percent vs.
50 percent and 72 percent). These data
indicate that as age and educational levels rise,
so does draft motivation.
The military services also receive many
non-prior service personnel who have civilian
acquired skills, such as those in law,
engineering or the computer field, which are
usable without extensive additional training.
The savings in advanced individual training
dollars is considerable, amounting to about
$60 million each year for the Army alone.
Interestingly, a review of Army records for
the months of March, April, and May 1969,
reveals that 90 percent of these direct
accessions entered the Army through the
draft and only 10 percent by enlistment.1
If quality declines seriously under a
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volunteer system, it will not only affect the
internal structure of the armed services but
also their effectiveness as a fighting force.
This is particularly true with the Army. It
must be remembered that while the basic
requirements of leadership, courage, and
practical intelligence for the fighting man are
still in demand, these alone are no longer
sufficient to cope with the technical advances
and future needs of a modern volunteer
Army.
Another ramification of lower quality
personnel is discipline. Discipline is the sine
qua non of an effective military force. An
examination of Army statistics in 1969
revealed a direct relationship between low
educational levels and stockade strength.15
While constituting only 19 percent of the
total Army population, soldiers with less than
a high school education represent nearly 77
percent of the population of the Army's
correctional holding detachments. There are
over twice as many representing the lower
mental category in these holding detachments
than their Army-wide strength warrants. It is
also interesting to note that during the
1947-48 "no draft" period, there was a
significant drop in the average mental
category with an attendant rise in courts
martial rates.
Quality is as critical as quantity in the
establishment of a viable and responsive
modern volunteer force. Standards must be
maintained and incentives developed which
will compete for the kind of manpower the
services need. The defense of our nation
demands nothing less.
FLEXIBILITY

Military flexibility is measured by two
s t a n d a r d s - t h e ability to meet first,
short-term, and second, long-range demands
for trained personnel and units. The active
forces exist to meet the national security
requirements of a sudden crisis, and Reserve
Components must be able to provide
reinforcing personnel and units in the near
term. Selective Service must supply the
long-range needs.
Although the ready reserve strength is
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Short order cafeteria line in the new Army.

nearly at its statutory limitation, the vast
majority of these men enlisted because of
draft pressure. The exact number of
draft-induced personnel serving in the Reserve
Components remains a matter of conjecture.
However, a 1968 Department of Defense
survey revealed that 80 percent of the
first-term Reserve Component volunteers
were draft-motivated.16 Other analyses have
placed this figure at over 90 percent.
It seems certain that the current high
manning level enjoyed by the reserves is a
d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e d r a f t . These
draft-motivated enlistments have benefited
the reserves in several ways:
- They have provided reserve units with a
waiting list of young men;
- They have insured a high level of
participation and performance because of the

threat of being ordered back to active duty
for unsatisfactory performance; and,
- They have provided more highly
educated accessions than could otherwise
have been expected.
The removal of the draft would eliminate
these benefits and cause a precipitous drop in
ready reserve strength. Unpublished statistics
of an Army task group studying the
all-volunteer concept estimated that without
the draft and additional incentives, the
combined enlisted drill strength of the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve would
drop to ineffective levels within five years.17
In the absence of the draft, the manpower
procurement problems of the reserves will
center on four areas: first, the loss of
d r a f t - i n d u c e d enlistments (which will
probably result in a general lowering of age
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and educational levels); second, a general
reluctance among men to sign an initial
enlistment obligation for six years of service
(which will in turn probably result in a
reduction of the current six-year term to
three years, tending to double turnover rates);
third, keen competition from business and
industry for part-time service; and finally, the
need to train recruiters and develop an
effective reserve recruiting program.
The task will not be easy. The economic
and social factors which motivated voluntary
enlistments in the reserves prior to World War
II are no longer operative. Pay, as a
supplement to income, is no longer as
important. With few exceptions, armories are
no longer the focal point for community and
social activities. Recognition and social
acceptance for reserve participation have
declined sharply. While patriotism still
motivates many, in today's sociopolitical
environment it is not strong enough to solve
the procurement problems of the reserves or
the active forces.
IMPLICATIONS

In 1605, Frances Bacon wrote, "If a man
will begin with certainties, he shall end in
doubts; but if he will be content to begin with
doubts, he shall end in certainties." This
paper has emphasized some of the many
doubts regarding the feasibility of the
all-volunteer armed force. Yet well-developed
studies indicate that with the proper mix of
incentives and benefits, military manpower
procurement and retention can be improved
to a point where a peacetime all-volunteer
armed force can be sustained. Why, then,
state the doubts? Because many powerful
opponents of the volunteer concept tend to
see only the doubts and make little effort to
remove them through rational analysis. But
unless these doubts are erased, they will
continue to compound the change-resistant
nature of bureaucracy in which there exists
gentle footdragging when it comes to
approving and implementing new concepts
and procedures required to achieve the
all-volunteer armed force.
The Department of Defense and the
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military services launched an all-out effort to
achieve the President's goal to end the draft.
Important programs have been developed to
compete for quality manpower among today's
youth. Notable among these is the Army's
effort known as the Modern Volunteer Army
(MVA).
The MVA effort is probably the most
misinterpreted and misunderstood program
ever initiated by Department of the Army.
Whenever MVA or VOLAR (its experimental
counterpart) is mentioned, many military
professionals and public officials immediately
perceive a permissive Army with beer in the
barracks, relaxed standards of discipline, long
hair, and "go go" girls. Nothing could be
further from the truth; yet this perception of
t h e Modern Volunteer Army Programs
persists. If the Modern Volunteer Army
Program is not what it is perceived to be,
what is it?
Succinctly stated, MVA is a comprehensive
e f f o r t d i r e c t e d t o w a r d strengthening
professionalism and improving Army life,
thereby enhancing the image of the Army and
significantly increasing enlistments.18
It was recognized from the beginning that
the key to a better Army was the
development of highly skilled small units.
This is not possible if the men who comprise
these units are available only on a part-time
basis.
Relieving soldiers from time-consuming
tasks such as Kitchen Police, hauling garbage,
firing furnaces, or cutting grass was not
designed to pamper soldiers, but to return
them to their commanders and sergeants so
that the skills of their profession could be
honed and their talents moulded into proud
and disciplined units.
Elimination of reveille and permitting 3.2
beer in the barracks were not permissive acts.
They were demonstrations of the Army's
attempt to treat those who do not abuse the
privilege as mature men.
Reducing the number of mandatory
training requirements and elimination of
much of the inspection and statistical pressure
were designed to free the commander to
conduct his unit training more effectively and
capitalize on his good judgment and

experience without excessive interference
from above.
These and other actions were combined
into a program to achieve a modern, more
professional, and satisfying Army. To
capitalize on these initiatives, a massive
advertising campaign was developed to
include a 10-week test of paid radio and
television commercials. The recruiter force
was nearly doubled and many more recruiter
stations were opened. To assist recruiters in
their e f f o r t t o increase enlistments
substantially, a unit-of-choice enlistment
program was initiated and other attractive
new enlistment options were offered.
Although all facets of the Modern
Volunteer Army Program are important, the
heart of the effort is centered in a field
experiment which began modestly in early
197 1 and was expanded greatly in subsequent
months. Known as VOLAR (Volunteer
Army), it targets on the Army's principal
problem: attracting and retaining the quantity
and quality of personnel needed for the
combat arms.
VOLAR involves a test of "resource
supported" actions to determine which are
the most productive and cost effective. It is
esentially a "cut and try" approach designed
to test and evaluate under local conditions
those measures which contribute best to
improved Army life and strengthened
professionalism. Those initiatives which prove
to be most effective will be selected for
Army-wide application during FY 1973.
Examples of actions being tested at VOLAR
installations include those designed t o
improve leadership, increase job proficiency
and job satisfaction, produce better trained
and more capable units, improve living
conditions for the soldier and his family, and
experiment with programs to deal with the
societal problems of the 70's such as drug
abuse, race relations, and Army image.
This is what the Modern Volunteer Army
Program is. It is not the cause of the troubling
problems of drug abuse, racial conflict, and
violent dissent which confront the Army
today. It is not a "giveaway" program which
compromises essential operational standards
in a shortsighted effort to entice more people

t o v o l u n t e e r . It is fundamentally a
developmental program which can revitalize
t h e professional pride and technical
competence of the people whose business it is
to guarantee the defense of this nation. T o see
it otherwise is to miss it wholly.
If this is the kind of Army we all seek, and
if it is the kind MVA advocates, then why do
so many oppose it? The reasons are not
always easy to isolate. Some are purely
emotional or philosophical in nature. Some
are pragmatic. Still others stem from
operational shortcomings in the program or
mistakes in its implementation and from
psychological causes dealing with internalized
determinants of human behavior.
Those who oppose a completely volunteer
armed force on emotional or philosophical
grounds represent a conscientious body in our
society who are greatly concerned with the
defense of our nation and the effectiveness of
our armed forces. They cannot be faulted
seriously for a deep dedication which has
imbued in them a belief that all young men
owe their country a military obligation.
However, their emotional involvement often
impedes realistic thinking and the tendency is
to disregard pragmatic evidence in favor of
philosophical arguments.
They fail to recognize that as desirable as
universal military training may appear to be,
the manpower pool in the United States has
grown t o a point where two million young
men turn 18 each year. Even at a 50 percent
rejection rate, the armed forces could not
accommodate the training requirements
imposed if all were required to serve. To do so
would necessitate a much larger training base,
an increase in the size of the regular forces,
and the opening of many new bases at a time
when the reverse is true. Even if these
requirements could be accommodated, the
cost would be far above that acceptable to the
American people.
A compulsory national service concept
would only compound the problem since
females would be added to the pool and
eligibles would increase to four million each
year. Even with a voluntary national service
program, it is doubtful-given the attitude of
youth today toward military service-that
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more would voluntarily enlist in the armed
forces than could be expected under current
conditions.
Many argue that even though we might
attract sufficient numbers of volunteers to
support the force levels expected in the 70's,
the armed forces would be composed of the
black and the poor. This objection has no
basis in fact. Army research and that of the
Presidential Commission indicate that blacks
are represented in the armed forces today in
about the same ratio as their national
proportion. Army projections reveal that
under the volunteer concept, the black
composition of the Army will rise from its
current level of 13 percent to about 16.5
p e r c e n t by 1980.19 The Presidential
Commission estimates an all-volunteer Army
would be composed of no more than 18
percent black.20
Three other important
considerations support these projections:
first, enlistment ratios between blacks and
caucasians have remained relatively constant
over time; second, built-in controls through
the Quality Management Program (up or out)
preclude dominance by the
disadvantaged-they can't compete; third,
many of the blacks and the poor have
alienated themselves from the
"establishment" and reversal of this trend will
be long and tedious.
Nor would an all-volunteer force be
composed of mercenaries. A mercenary serves
for pay alone without allegiance to country.
The volunteers we seek are not unconcerned
about this country and they will enlist for a
variety of reasons, including reasonable pay
and a sense of duty. If pay is the only
criterion for becoming a mercenary, then we
have a whole country full of them.
Pragmatically, the most compelling
argument against the all-volunteer armed
force is the cost. There is fear that the defense
budget will not be increased to provide for
the increased costs of an all-volunteer force.
As a result Department of Defense will have
to cut back expenditures in other areas, thus
contributing to the deterioration of our
military posture. There is little question that
increased pay and the cost of other incentives
will drive the cost of an all-volunteer force
26

higher than a draft-supported force of the
same size. No one knows what that cost will
be. Estimates range from $3 to $17 billion in
additional annual expenditures. This wide
range of judgments prevails, because it is
almost impossible to predict future human
behavior and accurately relate increased
incentives to increased enlistments Assuming
a post-Vietnam force level of from 2.25 to 2.5
million men, a reasonable estimate would
seem to be $5 to $6 billion additional each
year. This does not seem unreasonable when
it is realized that, the volunteer question
aside, the quality of military life ought to be
equal with that of the civilian community.
Among m a n y A r m y professionals,
o p e r a t i o n a l shortcomings, mistakes in
implementation, as well as psychological
hang-ups, all interacted to form unfavorable
attitudes toward the Modern Volunteer Army
Program. T o understand why, one must first
understand the events leading to the creation
of the office of the Special Assistant for the
Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA).
During the 1969-70 period, the official
Army position favored the creation of a
peacetime all-volunteer Army; however,
statements of some high Army officials
suggested less than full support for the
concept. For example, General Westmoreland
was quoted in an interview conducted by US
News and World Report as favoring an
all-volunteer Army.21 However, in testimony
b e f o r e t h e House Appropriations
Subcommittee, both he and his former
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
Lieutenant General Albert Connor, expressed
reservations. General Connor stated: "I do
not necessarily feel that an all-volunteer Army
is desirable. . . . I feel each of our young men
has an obligation to serve. I cannot see an
all-professional Army doing much more than
separating away from the people."
This kind of high level contradiction
contributed greatly to unsupporting attitudes.
I t reinforced traditional policies and
procedures and gave tacit support to resisting
changes advocated to achieve the volunteer
concept.
In September 1970, pressure was exerted
on the military services from the highest levels

generated natural resentment. In addition,
Department of Defense and Congressional
roadblocks further impeded rapid progress.
Because of the lack of funds, or approval,
or both, the initial changes thrust upon the
field were those that cost little or no money
and, for the most part, affected traditional
military values (beer in the barracks,
elimination of reveille, etc.). To m a n y
military professionals, these steps appeared t o
be superficial and implied a move toward
permissiveness. Also, too often the first word
of these dramatic changes reached those in
the field who had to implement them through
the pages of Army Times or other unofficial
publications. Neither the unit leadership nor
its members were aware of the real purpose
behind the changes or their part in the overall
program.
The Army's Master Program for the
Modern Volunteer Army was available in its

to show support for and progress toward the
President's goal to end the draft. Suddenly
and dramatically, in October 1970, the Army
Chief of Staff announced full support for the
volunteer concept and, as noted at the
beginning of this paper, committed the Army
fully to the task. At the same time he
appointed Lieutenant General George I.
Forsythe as his special assistant to direct the
effort. This sudden change in direction
created many false impressions and produced
what might be termed "culture shock" among
many professional soldiers.
The task of General Forsythe and his small
staff has not been an easy one. Almost
overnight a master program had to be
developed, actions costed, funds identified,
and progress toward this difficult goal
demonstrated. Complicating this process were
SAMVA's cross-functional responsibilities
which cut across all Army staff agencies and
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LTG George I. Forsythe, the special assistant to the Chief o f Staff,US Army, for the Modern Volunteer Army
(SAMVA) tours the US Army Personnel Center at Oakland Army Base.
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initial form by January 1971, but its
distribution was stopped because it had not
gone through the "normal" staffing at
Department of the Army. Admittedly, it was
prepared rapidly so that the field could be
informed early of the objective and the
underlying purpose of various actions, and
how they contributed to the ultimate goal-to
improve professionalism, create a better Army
life, and enhance the public prestige of the
Army. Although it was not as "finished" as
the current master program, it might have
countered much of the opposition, had it
been distributed as an interim document.
Instead, information reached the field in a
piecemeal fashion creating confusion and
doubt. The official master program was not
distributed until nearly a year after the birth
of SAMVA.
The older officers and noncommissioned
officers were not ready for the dramatic
changes which were thrust upon them by
MVA. They could not see a need for change,
since the traditional ways of doing things had
served the military and the country well in
the past. Many of the MVA actions disrupted
conditioned ways of doing business. This in
turn gave rise to tensions and stress; and
defensive behavior patterns emerged. This
psychological manipulation contributed
significantly to hostile attitudes toward the
agent of change, which in this case was MVA
and VOLAR.
In defense, it can only be stated that
SAMVA did not experience a natural birth.
Because of the urgency of time, it came into
being by caesarean and grew to maturity
before its musculature was developed enough
to support it. It was not expected to solve all
problems immediately, yet many thought it
should and would.
Mistakes were made. If one were required
to select a single error it would have to be
failure in communications. It is too late to
begin again, but much could be salvaged by a
revitalized information program which
explains to every soldier what has gone on
before, what is to be expected in the future,
and how it all fits into an integrated program
to create a better, more professionally
competent Army. A modern Army, not a
mod, permissive one.
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Such an information effort requires more
than the distribution of a master program and
more than the efforts of that small band of
SAMVA "warriors." It requires the total
commitment and support of the Army
leadership from the Chief of Staff to the
squad leader. It should be mounted now and
include feedback on the successes of MVA.
For it has indeed been successful despite the
early mistakes.
In the short time that it has been in
existence, SAMVA, in association with other
Army staff and command agencies, has
increased the recruiter force by 100 percent
and opened 600 new recruiter stations.
Overall enlistments since January 197 1 have
been 10 percent greater, despite declining
draft pressure. Combat arms enlistments for
calendar year 1971 are 800 percent greater
than for the same period last year.
Interestingly, Department of the Army
surveys show that 8,000 of these new
enlistments are directly attributable to paid
radio and television advertising.22 The cost
was $1,250 per enlistment, not the $10,000
often quoted by opponents of the program.
Many steps have been taken to strengthen
professionalism. T r a i n i n g h a s been
decentralized; Department of the Army
imposed training requirements have been
eliminated; leadership seminars have been
introduced; guard and details have been
reduced; and civilians have been hired for KP,
thus returning more soldiers to soldiering,
adventurous training, and improved basic
training.
Army life has been improved by the
elimination of unnecessary and demeaning
activities; by undertaking VOLAR projects at
selected installations; by putting money and
effort into barracks repair; by paying more
attention to soldiers as individuals; and by
lessening turbulence.
Perhaps the most valuable byproduct of the
MVA effort is that, for the first time, the
Army is taking a hard, scientific look at
leadership and training. Old ways of doing
things are being questioned. Human factors
are receiving long-delayed attention. It is
doubtful that this would have occurred
outside the context of the Modern Volunteer
Army.

Laudable as these efforts may be, the Army
and the other military services cannot do it
alone. Funds must be provided by Congress so
that we can properly take care of our
servicemen and the American people must
lend their full support t o the effort,
particularly the enormously influential news
media.
As these pages are written, the time t o
reach the President's goal of zero inductions
draws nearer. The challenge is tough and the
job is not easy. Opposition from some
quarters will continue because the nature of
the institutional changes required and the
r a p i d i t y w i t h which they must be
implemented precludes t h e deliberate staffing
so dear t o the hearts of the bureaucrats. There
is also the danger that high velocity actions
which were initially launched will lose their
impetus unless steps are taken t o insure the
continued zeal of those who replace the
original architects of the Modern Volunteer
Army Program. Nevertheless, the all-volunteer
armed force remains an attainable national
objective. Even if we fail to achieve that goal,
w e will h a v e brought long delayed
improvements t o the quality of life of those
who must wear this nation's uniform.
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